State tobacco lobbyists and organizations in the United States: crossed lines. by Goldstein, A O & Bearman, N S
Public Health Briefs
State Tobacco Lobbyists and
Organizations in the United States:
Crossed Lines
Adam 0. Goldstein, MD, and Nathan S. Bearman
Introduction
Over the last 10 years, communities
across the United States have passed
tobacco control measures that regulate
environmental tobacco smoke exposure.'
However, broad public support for to-
bacco control initiatives has not translated
into sustained increases in comprehensive
state or federal tobacco control legisla-
tion.2.3
On the other hand, the tobacco
itO' . '?',,'industryremains exceptionally competent
in defeating most state tobacco control
legislation.4 Legislators from tobacco-
producing states block most federal to-
bacco legislation. Research has shown
associations between federal and state
legislators who accept campaign contribu-
tions from the tobacco industry and their
votes on tobacco legislation.56 While
well-organized antismoking coalitions as-
sist the passage of tobacco control legisla-
tion, no states have coalitions with the
budget, experience, and resources to
match the tobacco industry.4'7
Tobacco lobbyists are frequently
mentioned as important agents influenc-
ing the outcome of tobacco-related legisla-
tion.8-11 When tobacco measures are
considered in state legislatures, tobacco
.. ..
control coalitions may have one part-time
lobbyist, whereas tobacco organizations
.i...........may have full-time lobbyists. There is little
research, however, to document the ex-
... tent of tobacco lobbying activity occurring
at the state level.
The primary goal of this study was to
determine the total number and character-
istics of tobacco lobbyists employed nation-
ally at the state level by tobacco organiza-
tions. We also determined the number of
health lobbyists employed by health orga-
nizations, and, because most tobacco
lobbyists represent more than one organi-
zation, we examined how many tobacco
industry lobbyists lobby simultaneously
for tobacco and health organizations.
Methods
In 1994, we obtained publicly avail-
able lobbyist data from all 50 US states.
Lists were sent free of charge or were
purchased from the appropriate agency
(e.g., state ethics bureaus, election boards).
Lists categorized lobbyists with their re-
spective organizations and/or alphabeti-
cally by organization.
Two principal types of information
were obtained from these lists: informa-
tion on lobbyists (individuals who lobby
on behalf of a private or public organiza-
tion) and information on the private- or
public-interest organizations represented
by lobbyists (e.g., Philip Morris, state
medical society).
From these lists, we created several
variables. The first was total number of
lobbyists in a state. If a lobbying firm was
listed without specifying the individual
lobbyist, the lobbying firm was counted as
only one lobbyist, producing an underesti-
mate of the total number of lobbyists. The
second variable was total number of
organizations (e.g., corporations, associa-
tions) that employed lobbyists. We were
not able, through the sources used in this
study, to distinguish whether lobbyists
worked part or full time. The third
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4 062 608 321
551 947 255
3 677 985 1 300
2 362 239 273
29 839 250 1 284
3 307 912 369
3 295 669 632
668 696 250
13 003 362 2 292
6508419 916
1 115 274 255
1 011 986 280
11 455 682 4 222
5 564 228 500
2 787 424 602
2 485 600 616
3 698 969 641
4 238 216 565
1 233 223 250
4 798 622 490
6 029 051 557
9 328 784 800
4 387 029 1 354
2 586 443 255
5137804 2024
803 655 824
1 584 617 376
1 206 152 595
1 113915 190
7 748 634 270
1 521 779 1 097
18 044 505 1 854
6 657 630 512
641 364 451
10 887 325 1 223
3 157 604 489
2 853 733 500
11 924 710 672
1 005 984 328
3 505 707 331
699 999 339
4 896 641 465
17 059 805 1 937
1 727 784 559
564 964 317
6216568 1304
4 887 941 1 454
1 801 625 500
4 906 745 614
455 975 664
49 022 783 39 468
4 980 456 789
































































































































































Note. Population data were derived from the 1990 US Census.
variable, tobacco-related organizations,
pertained to the name of an organization
whose principal function was related to
tobacco interests. Each tobacco organiza-
tion in a state was counted once. When
the same organization existed in two or
more states, that organization was counted
separately (e.g., Philip Morris has lobby-
ists in most states). The fourth variable
was total number of tobacco lobbyists
employed by the corresponding tobacco-
related organizations. From this variable,
we computed the total number of lobby-
ists in each state and the United States as
a whole. The mean number of tobacco
lobbyists per tobacco organization within
and across all states was derived by
dividing the total number of tobacco
lobbyists by the total number of tobacco
organizations. The fifth variable, number
of lobbying organizations per lobbyist,
represented the total number of organiza-
tions in a state represented by an indi-
vidual tobacco lobbyist. From this vari-
able, we computed the mean number of
lobbying organizations that tobacco lobby-
ists worked for within a state.
We also examined the number of
health lobbyists representing health-
related organizations in states. We de-
fined health lobbyists broadly to include
organizations lobbying for physicians, den-
tists, nurses, hospitals and voluntary health
associations, pharmaceutical companies,
allied health organizations, and other
health care corporations. Finally, we
recorded the number of health organiza-
tions that employed a lobbyist who also
lobbied for the tobacco industry.
Microsoft Excel (version 4.0) descrip-
tive and comparison statistics were used
in recording and analyzing data.
Results
Lobbying lists revealed that, in 1994,
a total of 36 468 lobbyists were active at a
state level for one or more organizations.
Of these lobbyists, 450 (1%) represented
tobacco-related organizations (Table 1).
All states had tobacco lobbyists (mean per
state = 9, range = 2 to 25). Each tobacco
lobbyist worked, on average, for 13 lobby-
ing organizations (range = 2 to 42). In
comparison with the 450 lobbyists work-
ing for tobacco organizations, there were
2999 lobbyists (8%) working for health-
related organizations. States had an aver-
age of 60 health lobbyists (range = 9 to
280).
The distribution of health lobbyists
by their primary affiliated health organiza-
tion showed that hospitals, hospital asso-
ciations, and health care associations
represented 52% of all health lobbying
organizations, with 1546 employed lobby-
ists. Professional medical associations,
academic medical centers, and medical
associations employed 806 health lobby-
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ists, or 27% of all such lobbyists. Public
health societies, nursing associations, and
other health groups employed 631 health
lobbyists (21%). In only nine states,
representing a total of 16 lobbyists, was
there a health lobbyist who was lobbying
for an organization whose primary mis-
sion was the reduction of tobacco con-
sumption.
Three hundred three health organiza-
tions employed lobbyists who also repre-
sented tobacco organizations (Table 2).
Five major categories of health organiza-
tions stand out as employing such lobby-
ists: physician professional associations
and societies; hospitals, hospital associa-
tions, and health care associations; phar-
maceutical organizations; optometry and
chiropractic associations; and medical/
health care corporations. States had, on
average, 6 health-related organizations
that employed tobacco lobbyists. Ten
states (Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Missouri, Ohio, Louisiana, Florida, Ari-
zona, Alabama, and Maryland) had 10 or
more health organizations that employed
such lobbyists. Of all tobacco lobbyists,
220 (49%) also worked as a lobbyist for at
least one health-related organization.
Figure 1 displays the total number of
state tobacco lobbyists by tobacco organi-
zation. Four tobacco organizations-
Philip Morris, the Tobacco Institute, RJ
Reynolds, and the Smokeless Tobacco
Council-employed 87% of the 450 to-
bacco lobbyists. Philip Morris and the
Tobacco Institute had lobbyists in all but
four states.
Discussion
Our research shows that the tobacco
industry had at least 450 state-level
lobbyists working on tobacco-related legis-
lation in 1994. These lobbyists had a
presence in all US states, and 20 states
had 10 or more tobacco lobbyists. In and
of itself, this number is perhaps not too
surprising, particularly since tobacco com-
panies have strong financial interests in
tobacco legislation. For instance, Philip
Morris and RJR Nabisco had combined
profits in 1994 of more than $5 billion on
revenues of more than $80 billion.'2"13
Tobacco industry lobbyists also lobby
for an average of 13 organizations, includ-
ing tobacco, advertising, insurance, vend-
ing machine, alcohol beverage, restau-
rant, convenience store, bank, and other
agencies. These alliances offer the indus-
try a chance to attach its interests more















































August 1996, Vol. 86, No. 8
Public Health Briefs
broadly to groups that otherwise may or
may not have an interest in the outcomes
of tobacco control legislation.
However, despite the seemingly large
number of tobacco lobbyists at a state
level in the United States, there are seven
times as many health lobbyists as tobacco
lobbyists. Some of these health organiza-
tions have taken active roles in lobbying
for stronger tobacco control legislation,
but most have many interests other than
the prevention of tobacco-related dis-
eases.4.8 Since such organizations have an
ability to join in lobbying efforts that will
allow for more effective tobacco control
coalitions, and since tobacco control coali-
tions that are well organized have greater
potential to counter activities of tobacco
industry lobbyists, public health advocates
should encourage all health organizations
to devote a portion of their lobbying
efforts to supporting broad-based tobacco
control efforts.4'7
Given that there are a very large
number of health lobbyists and that
tobacco lobbyists represent many differ-
ent organizations, it is also perhaps not
surprising that many tobacco lobbyists
also represent health organizations. How-
ever, important ethical questions are
raised by the fact that almost one of every
two tobacco lobbyists also lobbies for a
health organization, along with the fact
that more than 300 health organizations
in the United States employ on their
behalf a lobbyist who also works for the
tobacco industry. Moreover, our estimate
of the number of health-related organiza-
tions with such a conflict is conservative
because we excluded from consideration
organizations such as insurance compa-
nies that have health-related and non-
health-related missions.
Health organizations that employ
tobacco industry lobbyists are faced with
potential or real institutional conflicts of
interest. Therefore, it is incumbent on
health organizations and their constitu-
ents to know the details of all lobbying
and financial arrangements. Other re-
searchers have pointed out the ethical
inconsistencies for health organizations
that invest in tobacco industry stocks.'4
Our research shows that such inconsisten-
cies extend across the United States and
throughout many health care organiza-
tions.
Lobbyists who work for both health
and tobacco organizations also have poten-
tial and real individual conflicts of inter-
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FIGURE 1-Total number of state tobacco
on behalf of health organizations for any
tobacco use reduction measure for fear of
offending their tobacco employer. While
officials of the American League of
Lobbyists do not think that this represents
a conflict of interest, they do think that it
is inconsistent for a lobbyist to lobby for
both tobacco and health organizations.'5
Lobbyists have a minimum duty to inform
new and existing clients of potential
conflicts to allow for more honest delibera-
tions.
The potential adverse effects on
public health of such conflicts of interest
were demonstrated recently in Florida,
where lawmakers had passed legislation
in 1994 making it easier for the state to
pursue its $1.4 billion lawsuit on recover-
ing Medicaid expenses for smoking-
related illnesses. A bill to repeal the
legislation passed the Florida state senate
in April of 1995, supported by a 53-
member lobbying team assembled by the
tobacco industry.'6 Two thirds of the
tobacco industry lobbyists also repre-
sented hospitals and health insurance
companies. The lead lobbyist for Philip
Morris at the time reported that "we
wanted to have the first team, the best
people we could possibly find.... We
didn't care about their other clients."'6 By
hiring health lobbyists to work for the
tobacco industry, the industry assured
itself of detailed information about impor-
tant health care bills, thus allowing it to
"try to pass [bills] in every conceivable
form at every conceivable opportunity."'6
Limitations to our analysis primarily
stem from the source of the data. Some
lobbyists, by organization.
states have different procedures and for-
mats for recording lobbying information,
thus making it less accurate to use
lobbying lists for comparisons between
different states. It is also impossible to
determine from the lobbying lists whether
or not lobbyists work part time or full
time, how much they are paid for lobby-
ing, or the extent or effectiveness of their
lobbying activities. Such information, while
very important to an understanding of the
full extent of lobbying efforts, is not
completely obtainable under most circum-
stances.
Our analysis showing 450 state to-
bacco lobbyists in the United States
probably underestimates the extent of
tobacco-related lobbying occurring at the
state level for several reasons. As demon-
strated with the earlier example in Florida,
tobacco organizations frequently will hire
more lobbyists to work on a campaign as
an important bill advances in a state
legislature. In addition, tobacco organiza-
tions may hire lobbying or public relations
firms to lobby on their behalf without
disclosing the source of the lobbying
effort.
In conclusion, our analysis shows
that the number of lobbyists working for
the tobacco industry at the state level is
not nebulous, but can be counted, tracked,
and used by concerned participants. Pub-
lic health leaders should understand the
strategic importance that the tobacco
industry places on state-level lobbying.
Understanding the rationales, trends, and
meanings behind these numbers will
ultimately lead to an improved under-
American Journal of Public Health 1141
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standing of ways to affect legislative issues
that decrease tobacco consumption. O
Acknowledgment
This research was supported in part by grant
02293 from the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion.
References
1. Major Local Tobacco Control Ordinances in
the United States. Washington, DC: US
Dept of Health and Human Services; 1993.
2. Preventing Tobacco Useamong YoungPeople:
A Report of the Surgeon General. Washing-
ton, DC: US Dept of Health and Human
Services; 1994.
3. Strategies to Control Tobacco Use in the
United States: A Blueprint for Public Health
Action in the 1990's. Washington, DC: US
Dept of Health and Human Services; 1991.
4. Jacobson PD, Wasserman J, Raube K. The
politics of anti-smoking legislation.JHealth
Polit Policy Law. 1993;18:787-819.
5. Moore S, Wolfe SM, Lindes D, Douglas
CE. Epidemiology of failed tobacco control
legislation. JAMA. 1994;272:1171-1175.
6. Glantz SA, Begay ME. Tobacco industry
campaign contributions are affecting to-
bacco control policymaking in California.
JAMA. 1994;272:1176-1182.
7. Samuels B, Glantz SA. The politics of local
tobacco control. JAMA. 1991;266:2110-
2117.
8. Bearman NS, Goldstein AO, Bryan DC.
Legislating clean air: politics, preemption,
and the health of the public. NC Med J.
1995;56:14-19.
9. Wright JR. Contributions, lobbying and
committee voting in the U.S. House of
Representatives. Am Political Sci Rev.
1990;84:417-438.
10. Ferraro T. The tobacco lords: the tobacco
lobby. Multinational Monitor. January-
February 1992:18-20.
11. Gray C. The tobacco industry provides a
lesson in effective lobbying. Can MedAssoc
J. 1989;141:321-322.
12. Annual Report. New York, NY: Philip
Morris; 1994.
13. Annual Report. Winston Salem, NC: RJR
Nabisco; 1994.
14. Boyd JW, Himmelstein DU, Woolhandler
S. The tobacco-health insurance connec-
tion. Lancet. 1995;346:64.
15. Pallarito K. Can lobbyists represent to-
bacco and health? Modem Healthcare.
March 1993:20.
16. Tobacco, health lobbies merge to fight





twum~~~~~ssaon for 0.. H stan ..........
Ow~~~~uwestsataon and prior labora-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...........
tinystu4iessuggest that A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~............OI3V~~~~~~~H7eansurvive currently ac-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...............
.1......... .1..........)
..4.2An.. unIfPbkMQI
A New Route of Transmission for
Eschenichia coli: Infection from
Dry Fermented Salami
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Carl Custer, MS, Barbra Boesel, MS, MaryAnn Lambert-Fair, Jesse Majkowski,
MPH, Duc Vugia, MD, MPH, S. B. Wemer, MD, MPH, Jill Hollingsworth, DVM,
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Introduction
Dry fermented salami is representa-
tive of a class of traditional products in
which raw, ground meat is preserved by a
process of fermentation and drying.' The
lowered pH caused by fermentation and
the decreased available moisture caused by
drying, when combined with the inhibitory
effects of salt, curing agents, and other
spices, create a hostile environment for
most pathogenic bacteria.Z3 These prod-
ucts are considered ready to eat and are
generally not cooked before consumption.
In November 1994, an outbreak of 17
cases of Escherichia coli 0157:H7 infec-
tion in Washington State and California
was linked epidemiologically to consump-
tion of presliced dry fermented salami
(brand A).4 E. coli 0157:H7 had been
isolated from two intact packages of
brand A salami collected at the retail
level, with isolates from patients and the
implicated salami having identical pat-
terns by restriction fragment-length poly-
morphism analysis. Salami implicated in
these outbreaks had been produced by a
single facility (plant S) on August 25,
1994. Hypotheses for the presence of E.
coli 0157:H7 in this ready-to-eat product
included the following: (1) Organisms
present on raw meat ingredients survived
a substandard fermentation and drying
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